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 Social Inequality and Democracy: The Good Society 
in Low Caste Voices in Modern India 
Valerian Rodrigues 
While there has been extensive focus on exploring the nature of Indian nationalism 
little attention has been paid hitherto to the substantive character of democracy that 
came to prevail in India. While from early on there came to be expressed a concern 
on the feasibility of democracy in a country with widespread social inequalities no 
attention has been paid to the question whether the poor and the socially deprived 
themselves formulated a design of democracy and, if so, how it departed from 
mainstream perspectives on democracy in India. This paper argues that one can 
delineate a distinct and remarkably consistent perspective on this issue that the 
untouchable and low castes came to formulate, that can be termed as Dalit-Bahujan, 
around which large masses came to be rallied over the years, challenging the main-
stream understanding of Indian nation and democracy. This perspective came to be 
elaborated mainly by representatives of the lower castes who refused to confine it as 
an adjunct of the mainstream secular perspective or the communist movement in 
India. On all substantive issues this perspective had basic differences with Gandhi 
and the Gandhians. It was far from being subaltern and considered that the ideas 
and issues that it highlighted provided a framework to organize the self, society and 
polity universally and in far more desirable ways as compared to other perspectives 
at hand.  
Bahujan, literally ›majority people‹, means the masses »who have been devoid of 
humanity« in contrast to »a handful who take their pleasure, call themselves superior 
and live at the cost of the masses« (Omvedt 1976: 4). They are those whose claims 
and rights are consistently ignored and whose social location tends to condemn 
them to subservience. The term arose around 1906 within the Satyasodak (Search for 
Truth) movement in Maharastra. Excluded from bahujans are »not merely Brahmins 
but also the educationally advanced castes as well as merchant castes«. The concept 
has a class content as it »tends to exclude the aristocratic and wealthy among non-
Brahmins«, though if the upper classes came from a primarily peasant or poor non-
Brahmin caste they may identify themselves »in terms of their social roots« and 
culture of sentiments as part of the bahujan samaj (literally, majority community) 
(ibid.). The term becomes nebulous as we depart from a core set of social strata 
centrally encapsulated by it. The term that Satyasodak movement initially used to 
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denote those in opposition to bahujans was ›shetiji-bhatji‹. Bhatji refers to priests/ 
Brahmins. Shetji refers to merchants, primarily as merchant castes but is also used as 
an occupational title regardless of caste. This movement identified the primary 
contradiction of colonial society as between non-Brahmin peasant masses and the 
moneylender-landlord-bureaucratic-intelligentsia network within which Brahmins 
were dominant. The latter was perceived as the social base of colonialism. Two 
trends were noticeable within bahujans from early on: The first, an ideologically 
conservative and upper-class based, that came to be represented by the non-Brah-
min movement that spread mainly in Southern and Western India which contrasted 
non-Brahmins from Brahmins and pitted the former against the latter in the politi-
cal arena. The second, radical and peasant-based that contrasted the bahujan samaj 
from shetji-bhatji combine. The first claimed the unity of the masses against Brah-
mins and consequently claimed to represent the community/nation. The contradic-
tions within the community/nation were ignored in the process and no reflective 
attention was paid to forge internal unity. The second trend admitted contradictions 
within bahujans, but they were construed as contradictions within people. Jotirao 
Phule, for instance, distinguished between Shudras and Ati-shudras (the lowest of the 
low) but combined them into the united front of shudratishudras. He argued that they 
together faced a common enemy and were subjected to deprivation, humiliation and 
exploitation in common although the extent of it varied. Ati-shudras suffered these 
indignities the most. But shudratishudras shared a common condition and inhabited a 
world of shared meanings, sentiments and practices.  
The term ›Dalit‹ primarily refers to untouchable castes and communities that are 
struggling to change the prevailing social relations of servility, contempt, deference 
and ranking. Although the term has been in use earlier the popularisation of the 
term took place in the 1970s with the emergence of the radical Dalit Panther 
Movement. Contradictions within an inclusive bahujan category emerged antago-
nistically to the fore as untouchable politicians came to highlight disabilities unique 
to them from the second decade of 20th century. Once caste relations were brought 
to the fore to the neglect of shared ways of life, or the former were seen as basic, 
they inevitably led to parting of ways. Dalit politics eventually came to spawn an 
autonomous trajectory with its distinct emphases while those taking their stance on 
bahujans stressed on issues which were not considered by dalits as central to their 
concerns. 
Therefore while noting the shared concerns in dalit-bahujan thought-current, we 
cannot ignore the ambivalences, pulls and pressures within it. This paper while 
noting such tensions, however, suggests that a whole range of normative issues 
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concerning public life are common across them and the differences and conflicts 
have to be understood from such a shared understanding.1 
Self-Respect/»Manuski« 
The entire spectrum of dalit-bahujan thought is strongly evocative of self-respect, 
captured by terms such as izzat in Hindi/Urdu, suya mariyadhai in Tamil and manuski 
in Marathi. The movement led by E. V. Ramasamy, popularly known as Periyar, was 
called Self-respect Movement. Dalit-bahujan thought acknowledges that although 
many aspects of self-respect are context-specific, there are certain larger and univer-
sal indicators of respect such as regard to human person qua human and his/her 
bodily integrity; the distinction between human and non-human and the conception 
of self-worth ensuing therefrom2. It insists that self-respect is prior to other basic 
human claims and is a precondition to make such claims. Self-respect, in turn, in-
vokes deference to the essential dignity of its claimant and places him/her at a cer-
tain level-playing field although in many respects people may be unequal and differ-
ent. This dignity is manifest when one refuses to crouch before others, irrespective 
of the goods on offer for such acts and dispositions and disregardful of the depri-
vation such refusal can bring. In the absence of self-respect people are susceptible 
to be treated instrumentally as per the pleasure of others. For Periyar, self-respect is 
man’s birthright and must precede swaraj or self-government. »Swaraj is possible 
only where there is already a measure of self-respect.«3 
The condition of low castes and untouchables is not merely a denial of self-re-
spect but a constant assault on the same whenever they make their demands. The 
worst afflicted in this regard are untouchables who are denied any resources 
through which they can build a positive estimation of themselves. Annihilation of 
caste and abolition of untouchability therefore become central political concerns of 
this perspective as they alone would enable their members to make their claims 
confidently in the public forum and enable them to participate as free and equal 
members of the citizen-community.  
Self-respect in dalit-bahujan thought is directed against the construction of a self 
which seeks to place itself over and above the others in an order of ranking and 
—————— 
 1  Such a claim is made in spite of the political antagonism between certain dalit-based parties on one 
hand and bahujan-based parties on the other. 
 2  Self-respect is an important theme in contemporary political philosophy and rhymes closely with 
some of the central considerations of dalit-bahujan thought: John Rawls considers self-respect as 
»perhaps the most important primary good« a rational person seeks (see: Rawls 1973: 440). 
 3  Quoted in Geetha/Rajadurai (1998: 297). 
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where active engagement with the world through labour, productive and reproduc-
tive, is seen as defiling. It challenges the cultural value that the more removed one is 
from productive and this-worldly engagements the more ennobled one becomes. 
Positively it asserts the sensuous nature of the human self which through its asso-
ciational ties is able to direct itself and shape the world around it.  
Self-respect is a virtue closely bound with community and therefore is a public 
virtue or the virtue of the public place. Dalit-bahujans are deeply critical of exhorta-
tions that egg on the socially deprived to pursue their self-respect without consid-
ering the resistance of social relations, mores and social institutions towards such a 
pursuit. Pursuit of self-respect necessarily requires transformation of beliefs and 
practices which have hitherto treated people with contempt and humiliated them. 
At the same time self-respect cannot be engendered through the generosity of oth-
ers. It cannot but be the outcome of the collective striving of those dispossessed of 
their respect. There is much in this thought that shows contempt towards those 
who are not prepared to involve themselves in the struggle for self-respect. This 
was one of the fundamental differences between Gandhi and Ambedkar in their 
approach to untouchability, a social condition, which both of them recognized as of 
utter contempt and degradation. Gandhi argued that untouchability has no sanction 
in the Hindu scriptures. If the upper castes put an end to being disrespectful to-
wards untouchables and made reparation for their past indignities, the requisite 
milieu for the pursuit of self-respect would be made available to untouchables4. 
Ambedkar insisted on self-effort, destruction of institutions and values that heaped 
abuse on backward classes in general and untouchables in particular and demanded 
that social life be based on principles conducive to self-respect.  
Dalit-bahujan thought targeted certain texts, thinkers and tendencies for de-
fending and legitimizing denial of self-respect. Manu-smriti, the classical text of law, 
was clearly the butt of ridicule. This text was seen as standardizing and legitimizing 
the degradation of dalit-bahujans. Annie Besant was to become one of the most 
reviled leaders among dalit-bahujan writings and speeches as she defended this text5 
and upheld the superiority of Brahmins over the rest, particularly the untouchables 
(see: Ambedkar 1945: Ch. I; Geetha/Rajadurai 1998: 6–10, 41, 44).  
—————— 
 4  For Gandhi’s approach to untouchability, see: Parekh (1989). 
 5  Annie Besant in New India, quoted in Geetha/Rajadurai (1998: 31). 
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Opposition to Brahminism 
Dalit-bahujan thought constructs brahminism as a comprehensive and pervasive 
ideology. If self-respect is the fundamental striving of this constituency then brah-
minism is its principal opponent. It saw brahminism as militating against self-re-
spect by its tendency of ranking, where some are considered inferior and others 
superior, irrespective of their merit and effort; for not relating desert to effort; for 
circumscribing the compass of striving; for proscribing certain kinds of pursuits and 
making one’s estimate of self-worth equal to one’s caste ranking. Besides it con-
stantly strove to breed dependence and subservience. Ambedkar argued, »Inequality 
is the official doctrine of Brahminism«, and »the suppression of the lower classes 
aspiring to equality has been looked upon by them and carried out by them without 
remorse as their bounden duty« (Rodrigues 2002: 146). Self-respect Movement, 
therefore, saw as its primary objective the destruction of brahminism (Geetha/ 
Rajadurai 1998: 296). 
Ambedkar primarily saw the power of brahminism manifest in reproducing a 
system characterized by graded inequality, and making it almost impossible for the 
lower sections to overthrow this system. Every rung of the system, except the low-
est, had a vested interest in guarding its ›superior‹ self by being contemptuous of 
those below it. Attempts to reform it from within beget additional social rungs 
incorporating the reformers rather than undermining the system. He however felt 
that brahminism as an ideology proposing a set of ideals and justifications has to be 
distinguished from Brahmins who are the high priests of this ideology. He often 
used to say »My quarrel with the Hindus and Hinduism is not over the imperfec-
tions of their social conduct. It is much more fundamental. It is over their ideals« 
(e.g. Ambedkar 2002a: 317). 
Brahminism invests knowledge and texts in the charge of a distinct and superior 
stratum and gives to the members of this stratum exclusive authority over them. It 
has a resilience and capacity to adjust to new contexts and situations, rare to any 
ideology. Phule felt that although British rule had put an end to »physical slavery«, 
mental slavery »persists through the Brahmanical texts« (Deshpande 2002: 45). 
Overall he felt the British rulers had fallen a victim to the insinuations of brahmin-
ism. It induced and confined the rulers to mundane pleasures while wielding the 
controlling and regulatory mechanisms in its own hands.6 
Brahmins alone do not reproduce brahminism. Everybody who lives by the ide-
als of brahminism contributes to its reproduction even though he might be an un-
touchable himself/herself. Phule argued in Shetkaryacha Asud that it is all pervasive 
—————— 
 6  The way Phule addresses The Cultvator’s Whip (Setkaryacha Asud) to the Governor General dem-
onstrates such a perception abundantly. 
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and malleable (Deshpande 2002: 113–190). Dalit-bahujan leaders often suggest that 
countering brahminism was much more difficult than countering colonial power. It 
is deeply implicated in the sacral. It brings together a set of interests in congruence 
with certain norms and justifications upheld by it. However, Brahmins tend to 
benefit from it, economically and otherwise, as do the different ranks in caste hier-
archy all the way down till the last rung. Therefore opposition to brahminism af-
fects the Brahmins materially as it does the upper castes although to different de-
grees. For dalit-bahujan thinkers brahminism, therefore, is not merely the ideology 
of rank and status, but is deeply implicated in economic exploitation as well.  
Several dalit-bahujan thinkers suggest that brahminism consolidated itself by 
opposing Buddhism and by appropriating some of its principles and practices as its 
own. Brahmins arrogated to themselves what was truly the role of a class of wise 
men in Buddhist society as the traditional custodians of ethical norms and values. 
They succeeded in setting aside the Buddhist character of Indian culture with Vedic 
culture. They made deep forays into Buddhist traditions. They adopted the Upani-
shads which were originally Buddhist creations. Ambedkar felt that several charac-
teristic features of Buddhism were to be embraced by resurgent brahminism, such 
as, vegetarianism, banning cow-slaughter and moral stances of the Bhagavadgita. At 
the same time Brahmins showed deep contempt towards the Buddhist Sangha and 
stipulated the basis of untouchability (see: Ambedkar 1948). Periyar argued that one 
of the characteristic features of brahminism was to poach into thought-currents 
which may threaten its dominance and appropriate elements of them selectively 
(see: Geetha/Rajadurai 1998: 318).  
The nationalist movement under the auspices of the Brahmins was suspect in 
the estimation of dalit-bahujans. The latter were quick to note that the Brahmins 
were proposing a unity at the higher level of the nation without seriously trying to 
undermine their exclusivity, superiority and rank. They saw such nationalism as 
another version of brahminism (see ibid.: 29–30) now reinforced with the resources 
available to the former.  
Is the way out of brahminism conversion to another religion? The response of 
the dalit-bahujan movement to this query has been deeply ambivalent. It has, by and 
large, upheld the right of people to choose their religion. It has often seen such 
choices as interfaced with respect, dignity and belonging. But scholars such as 
Iyothee Thass,  
»refused any engagement with Christianity and Islam. In his view these religions might help the 
pariah get out of the clutches of Brahmanism but would not be able to provide them with spiritual 
and philosophical resources to confront the latter. Such resources, in his opinion, could only be 
offered by Buddhism which was not alien to the culture of his people« (ibid.: 104).  
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Phule appreciated the work of Christian Missionaries but while not seeing them as 
an arm of the colonial power he did not seriously pursue the option to Christianity 
either. Ambedkar waited for long to embrace Buddhism and when he did so he 
sought a Buddhism that distanced itself from existing Buddhisms. 
The distinction between brahminism as an ideology and Brahmins as a social 
group which dalit-bahujan thinkers make is not sustained across their writings and 
practices, except, probably in Ambedkar. They often collapse the two leading to a 
great deal of avoidable essentialism and the political consequences flowing there-
from. The equating of brahminism with Brahmins leads to the denial of rights and 
self-evaluation, avowed ardently by dalit-bahujan thought. Besides identifying 
brahminism with Brahmins does not let dalit-bahujans to be adequately self-critical 
of themselves and probe into the brahminism within themselves. It nurtures the 
vicious circle of identity politics as essentialization of Brahmins rebounds back on 
all conceivable bonds of the kind.  
Recourse to Hermeneutics  
Dalit-bahujan thought as other thought currents in Modern India takes extensive 
recourse to interpretation and sometimes reflectively argues for its necessity. 
Through appropriate interpretative modes it attempts to undermine the spiritual 
hold of the Brahmins. A majority of the Dalit-Bahujan thinkers – Jotirao Phule, 
Narayan Guru, Iyothee Thass, E. V.Ramasamy and B. R. Ambedkar – consider it 
important to comment on significant texts of the tradition and popular practices.  
This turn to interpretation is both subversive and constructive. It attempts to 
subvert dominant renderings of texts and traditions and proposes readings distinc-
tive of its own. In the process many texts are rejected as insignificant; several others 
are reordered and the set of criteria employed to rank texts are recast. Interpretation 
helps in installing meanings and explanations which are seen as reasonable and to 
outwit theological, scholastic, ritualistic and superstitious renderings of texts and 
events. 
Such attempts to resort to interpretation of hallowed texts and events and sub-
ject them to the scrutiny of critical reason is pervasive across dalit-bahujan thought. 
In Gulamgiri Phule casts the avatars in human forms who employ various devices, 
schemes and strategies to subjugate the shudratishudras (Deshpande 2002: 23–100). 
With regard to brahminical texts this trend of thought not merely attempts to sub-
vert a text but also attempts to demonstrate the depravity and hollowness of the 
thought and character of Brahmins. At the same time the significance of these texts 
in constituting a brahminical hegemony is demonstrated. Occasionally one can note 
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attempts to salvage certain ideas of a text and placing them on an entirely new 
footing as Ambedkar does with Upanishads or the Sankya (Ambedkar 2002c:  
208–216). But by and large mainstream brahminical texts are seen by dalit-bahujan 
votaries as far too enmeshed in relations of rank and hierarchy, making it well nigh 
impossible to retrieve them for emancipatory endeavours or strivings of self-re-
spect. One therefore hears the occasional war-cry: »The shastras have to be de-
stroyed« (Ambedkar 2002b: 263–305).  
Often dalit- bahujan thought invoked symbols and categories, played around 
nuances, made dominant categories supple against their rigidified meanings and 
deployed them for the task in hand. Rosalind O’Hanlon tells us how Phule took 
recourse to the Maratha-Kunbi category for the purpose (O’Hanlon 1985). Recourse 
to interpretation highlights the centrality of Buddhism as a highly esteemed past. 
Iyothee Thass argued that in the past the sub-continent was known as Indirar De-
sam. Indirar was none other than Buddha who had managed to control his five 
senses successfully. India, according to him, was a transmuted form of the word 
›varatha‹, one of the names by which Buddha was known.7 He made elaborate for-
ays into tactics supposedly employed in texts that led to Pariah lowliness. According 
to him the Brahmins renamed the aadi ritual of Ambigai as the appeasement of an 
angry goddess as the Portuguese Missions transformed the verkanni cult by installing 
a figure of Mary, the mother of Jesus, there. Amman ritual came to be overlaid with 
other tales. He re-rendered the entire varna division as prevailing in Tamil country 
as made of functional interdependence between the vellala, vaniga, arasar and an-
damar communities pursuing production, trade, rule and wisdom respectively, prior 
to their cooption into brahminism. Such interpretative engagement was regarded by 
many of them as indispensible to set up the cultural and normative moorings of 
their pursuits.  
Is there a limit to such interpretations? Dalit-Bahujan thought responded in three 
ways to such a query. When interpretation is pitted against an enemy a prosaic ren-
dering of myths and legends is sometimes rhetorically deployed by it to win an 
argument and to bring down the high and mighty. Sometimes, as in Ambedkar, 
certain scholarly arguments already established could weigh in favour of a specific 
interpretation even against the prevailing traditional reading of a text. But a majority 
of dalit-bahujan thinkers invoke popular reasoning or practices to reinforce their 
interpretation. Phule and Periyar are versatile in this regard as they invoke folk 
practices to support their interpretation.  
—————— 
 7  Iyothee Thass, Indirar Desa Charitam, 2nd ed., Andersonpet: KGF. 1957, quoted in Geetha/ 
Rajadurai (1998: 98). 
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Historiography 
For dalit-bahujan thought persons endowed with reason and associated into a 
community of law as equals is an essential but not an adequate condition for en-
suring continued and enduring bonds of social cooperation. Invoking pre-brah-
manical communities or communities outside the vortex of brahminical hegemony 
is quite central to this discourse and such communities are portrayed as endowed 
with attributes conducive to the challenges of the present. These communities are 
envisaged in numerous ways: Masilamani and Iyothee Thass’ writings construct 
Dravidianism as a pre-Aryan civilization spread across the sub-continent which 
eschewed violence, was pacific in character, forbade consumption of alcohol and 
adhered to the creed preached by the Buddha. Phule in Gulamgiri argues that the 
ideal rule of King Bali was brought to a deplorable end by the Aryan-Brahmin rule. 
The Aryan Brahmins established their dominance, by conspiring against the pre-
Aryan Kshatriyas and deceiving them. The former even erased the history of the 
conquered. They constructed their history to gratify and confirm themselves in their 
dominance. They cheated and co-opted the rulers of the land and made themselves 
indispensable as ministers, advisers at courts, prophets, soothsayers, medicinemen 
and law-givers. Except for Ambedkar who makes the brahminical ideology as his 
central target of attack and not the ethnic moorings of Brahmins, there is a broad 
agreement among dalit-bahujan thinkers that Brahmins are ethnically a distinct 
element and do not constitute an integral part of the rest of the community. Dalit-
bahujans, including Ambedkar, strive to retrieve a past that does away with brah-
minical legacies and they feel that they can confidently look to a future only with 
such a past as their communitarian basis. The search is for a community sans brah-
minism. 
Their histroriographical perspective is largely shaped by the concern to demar-
cate the masses and community from their brahminical entanglement. Iyothee 
Thass saw the fall of Buddhism and the rise of brahminism as simultaneous events 
and his text Indirar Desa Caritham set about establishing the links between the two. 
Ambedkar too was to do the same (see: Ambedkar 1987a). Iyothee Thass argued, as 
was Ambedkar later, that the victory of brahminism brought about a sea change not 
merely in social relations but in prevalent systems of thought and the normative 
order (Geetha/Rajadurai 1998: 96). Ambedkar was to describe it as counterrevolu-
tion (see: Ambedkar 1987a), almost invoking the imagery of the course of the 
French revolution. Thass argued that Pariahs were in fact the original Tamils whose 
religion was Buddhism. Pariah was degraded and his religion was systematically 
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destroyed when Aryan invaders from the North imposed their rule and culture on 
the original Tamils8. 
Phule uses the term Arya Bhat Brahmins, sometimes shortened as Arya Brah-
mins or Bhat Brahmins, or simply Brahmins to refer to Brahmins and inclusively to 
refer to the twice-born castes vis-à-vis the Shudras and Ati-shudras. He projects the 
Arya Bhat Brahmins as early invaders to India who attempted to subdue the indige-
nous people through successive waves of attack, deceit and cunningness. In Gulam-
giri he constructs the different avatars as leaders of Aryans attempting to subdue 
local population and the valiant resistance that the local communities organized 
against such invasions. The indigenous people were organized into thickly knit 
communities with their distinct social institutions, festivities and practices. They 
were basically egalitarian societies. Phule acts the anthropologist, reconstructing the 
values and practices that bound peasant communities together which demarcated 
them from the brahminical values and practices. He sees the varna-system and the 
caste-based organization of society as the characteristic approach of the Arya Brah-
mins. They defeated the indigenous people, whom they termed dasyus and reduced 
them to Shudras and bade them to serve their victors. Those indigenous people 
such as the Mahars and Mangs9 who fought valiantly were to be condemned as un-
touchables.  
The various stages of this hisorigraphy which find broad agreement across dalit-
bahujan writings are as follows10: a) the pre-Aryan communities; b) the Aryan domi-
nance with considerable regional variations across India; c) the revolution wrought 
by the Buddha; d) the counterrevolution against the revolutionary transformation 
wrought by Buddhism and the marginalization of dalits and other non-Brahmin 
communities; e) the arrival of Islam to India and exodus of sections of the op-
pressed to its fold which was seen by the majority of dalit-bahujan thinkers as a 
rebellion against brahminism; f) the arrival of the British and the hopes and chal-
lenges their presence held out. 
—————— 
 8  Ambedkar develops a similar argument for the origin of the untouchables in India, see: Ambedkar 
(1948). 
 9  Phule attempts to relate »American Shudras« and »Indian Shudras« by adducing similiarity in names 
and customs. The American Shudras were Dasyus who took flight from India when they were at-
tacked by the Aryans through a pathway near China, »now called Bering Straight« (see: Deshpande 
2002: 147). 
 10  Ambedkar, however, does not strongly avow the first stage. He speaks of the Nag people and their 
tradition but does not dwell on it much. He postulates pre-Vedic tribal communities which suffer 
disintegration with the consolidation of brahminism. 
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Positive Reception to Modernity 
The ambivalences towards modernity and an attempt to salvage a non-negotiable 
domain vis-à-vis colonial modernity in the nationalist discourse in India have been 
highlighted in recent studies (see: Kaviraj 1997; Chatterjee 1995 etc.). While there 
are philosophical and sociological reflections rejecting modernity that nationalist 
discourse threw up, although not consistent and epistemologically sensitive always, 
there is no sufficient reflection that modernity could be anchored on to diverse 
conceptual mappings (Taylor 1999; Bhargava 2001). Often opposition to modernity 
was and is not opposition to modernity as such but simply to a particular version of 
modernity.  
Dalit-bahujan thought not merely extends a positive reception to modernity but 
also upholds a distinctive version of the same, markedly different from that of 
mainstream nationalism11. Further dalit-bahujan thought regards modernity as a 
significant advance over the past. The cultural identity which mainstream national-
ism formulated was termed by dalit-bahujan thought as deeply oppressive. Dalit-
bahujan thought is predisposed towards a more substantial version of modernity 
spilling into the ›inner‹ cultural domain compared to mainstream nationalism and 
modernity was seen as helping refurbish the cultural project enormously. This 
strand of thought does not see modernity as exclusively British or Western although 
its available versions might have been deeply marked by them. Modernity has a 
universal import and colonial modernity and the modernity that Brahmins were 
trying to install in India can be interrogated through it. It is not merely the other but 
is superior to the principles expressed in existing social institutions. It heralds the 
triumph of reason, human reason. What is handed down, beliefs and practices, and 
even experiences are suspect unless they are accounted for through demonstrable 
and satisfactory reasoning. 
Have the British inaugurated another mode of rule or an entire way of life? This 
was an issue of central importance to dalit-bahujan thought as it was to others. 
Dalit-bahujan thought acknowledged that British rule has reflectively come to avow 
the modern project in India with the considerations of colonial rule built into it. In 
the pre-modern period human thought and practices were caught in myth, supersti-
tions, religious world-views and rituals. Such thought and its corresponding prac-
tices led to the marginalization and oppression of dalits and bahujans. Often such 
modes of domination and exploitation are perceived dialectically in terms of the 
opposition they provoked. The opposition could be philosophical as in Lokayata or 
—————— 
 11  Partha Chatterjee has argued that mainstream nationalism in India makes the distinction between the 
»outer« and »inner« domains and sees its rationale in upholding the latter (see: Chatterjee 1995:  
3–34). 
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Samkya; moral and religious as in Buddhism; or communitarian, marking off the 
cultural community from Aryanism/brahminism as in Phule. Ambedkar, however, 
belittles such oppositions once brahminism became triumphant over Buddhism. He 
thinks that local communities came to be drawn within the vortex of brahminism 
with little capacity to mount an effective opposition. Therefore communities of 
bhakti do not enjoy much of a regard in Ambedkar’s strategy of emancipation and 
linguistic communities do not have a pre-eminence in his thought as we find in the 
self-respect movement. 
Dalit-Bahujan thought is not simply counterposed to tradition. Support to mod-
ernity did not mean opposition to tradition. Customs and traditions are valid to the 
extent that they are reasonable. But given the fact that they were interwined with 
hierarchy and ranking they were seen as deeply suspect unless it was proven other-
wise. Reason, therefore, is subversive: »For every act of independent thinking puts 
some portion of apparently stable world in peril« (Ambedkar 2002a: 318).  
Several dalit-bahujan thinkers construe the beliefs and practices of the bahujans, 
once they are sanitised from brahmanical intrusions, as imbued with good reason. 
Jotirao Phule came to valorize a number of customs and traditions prevalent among 
Bahujans and contrasted them against brahminical ways. The former were projected 
as reasonable, sustained communities, upheld mutual respect and promoted com-
mon good. Ambedkar, however, resorts to Buddha’s teachings and practices, rather 
than customs and traditions, as the very embodiment of reason and constructs the 
brahminical tradition in opposition. The brahminical tradition is portrayed as pro-
moting hierarchy, ritualism, superstitions, priest-craft, deceit and cunning. At the 
same time Brahmins are shown as employing modernity for their own aggrandise-
ment to the extent their status is not affected and their hold over the people is not 
loosened. For Brahmins therefore modernity is of instrumental value while for the 
dalit-bahujans it throws up resources for their enablement and therefore emancipa-
tory12. 
Colonial modernity, however, is perceived by this thought as enormously 
strengthening the brahminical order: through modern education and employment 
opportunities; through the deployment of texts and interpretations that were con-
ducive to it; through the religious policy of the British Raj; valorization of a Brah-
min-centred culture; expansion of media and print; formation of political organiza-
tions and the construction of a Brahmin centred state-craft. While early nationalist 
—————— 
 12  This is a constant refrain in Phule’s works. D. R. Nagaraj has argued that the entry of modernity led 
to the deskilling of people and it primarily affected the artisan classes. While this point is accepted by 
the dalit-bahujan discourse, it argues that Brahmins came in the way of reskilling dalit-bahujans by 
employing tools of modernity (see: Nagaraj 1993). 
 R O D R I G U E S :  S O C I A L  I N E Q U A L I T Y  A N D  D E M O C R A C Y  117  
 
opinion in India attacks the colonial rulers for not being adequately liberal, dalit-
bahujan thought attacks them for not being adequately modern. 
Can reasoning alone beget stable and shared ways of life and avoid the traps of 
amassing of resources in a few hands and the inequalities it breeds? Dalit bahujan 
thought sometimes tried to avoid this question by locating reasoning intersubjec-
tively and in the communitarian context. Reasoning is not a technical competence 
of calculating costs and benefits for oneself but is the capacity to discern what is 
good and right, together with others. Dalit-bahujan writings therefore constantly 
employ the dialogic mode of writing. Phule’s Gulamgiri and Ambedkar’s The Buddha 
and His Dhamma are apt examples for the same. Further dalit-bahujans constantly 
refer to a site of reasoning embodied in lived ways often in opposition to brahmini-
cal ways.  
Such a reasoning is deeply embedded in the sensuous ways of life as it is in the 
reflective. Ambedkar constructs the Buddha as the very embodiment of these quali-
ties. Reason is counterposed to the ritualistic and other-worldly ways. It encom-
passes the joys and sorrows, challenges and setbacks of life. Both men and women 
are equally pre-disposed to it if conditions are conducive for the same. It is self-
corrective and does not need an external source for rectification of wrongs and 
validation of right ways. 
The invocation of a specific modernity with human reasoning as central to it 
makes dalit-bahjan thought to recommend a number of ways of cultivating and 
cherishing it. There is an inordinate emphasis on education but not necessarily 
science and technology. Education is the indispensable means to cultivate one’s 
capacity for reasoning and enables one to make one’s own choices. It is able to 
counter the scheming and deceit perpetuated on dalit-bahujans. One of the constant 
refrains in this thought is inveighing brahminism against depriving dalit-bahujans 
from access to education. Ambedkar chastises Mahatma Gandhi for conceding 
education to dalits but asking them to earn their livelihood by following their tradi-
tional occupations. Education also helps people to understand the texts and to 
subject them to reasoned scrutiny. It buttresses self-respect and enables people to 
be assertive.  
Oppression and Colonialism 
There is an argument that Dalit bahjan thought has been soft on Colonialism. Re-
cently G. P. Deshpande has reiterated this argument with reference to Phule: »Phule 
and his comrades and followers ended up taking softer and softer positions on 
British Imperialsm and ultimately lost ground to the nationalist movement« 
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(Deshpande 2002: 19). Such a reading makes Deshpande to conclude that Phule’s 
system needs »a new extra input of a theory of imperialism« (ibid.: 20). This criti-
cism against dalit-bahujan thought is not new but has been a major theme in main-
stream nationalist discourse.  
Phule and other dalit-bahujan thinkers are not less sensitive to the exploitation 
that colonialism had bred but they felt that it had also brought in its wake resources 
to undermine that exploitation. They felt that colonialism had reinforced certain 
structures of oppression in India and it had enormously benefited certain social 
strata. Phule argued that taxation under colonialism transferred resources from the 
poor to the rich in the form of higher education whose beneficiaries were Brah-
mins. It led to »the virtual monopoly of all the higher offices under them (Govern-
ment) by the Brahmins« (ibid.: 34). He felt that colonial education provided little to 
enable Shudra students (ibid.: 67). He felt that colonialism has reinforced the posi-
tion of Brahmins: »Today it is the Bhats again who rule though under the name of 
the British« (ibid.). He felt that the British did not succeed in putting an end to 
institutions and customary practices which grossly favoured the Brahmins under the 
Peshawas (ibid.: 103). It is the peasantry who bore the yoke of colonial dispensation. 
Besides British colonialism had shunted lakhs of Shudra and Ati-shudra employees 
in various state jobs under the Muslim rulers to agriculture.  
Phule does not have the technical apparatus, of theories and concepts, for the 
analysis of colonial modernity. Equipped with them, Ambedkar was to undertake 
extensive work on the impact of colonialism on Indian society particularly in his 
early studies13. Ambedkar sees colonialism as a profoundly contradictory phenome-
non: On one hand it introduces newer and more intense forms of exploitation; on 
the other it creates the conditions and resources to undermine not merely colonial 
exploitation but other forms of oppression as well. Ambedkar and the Dalit-Bahu-
jan movement are acutely aware that given the precipitation of masses in the public 
arena the colonial regime will not be able to hold out for long. The central question 
before them was not whether the colonial regime has to be undermined or not, but 
who will wield power on its ruins?  
Positive Disposition to Power 
Several writers have noted the prevarications on political power in the nationalist 
discourse and often it is attributed to the repressive role that state apparatuses came 
—————— 
 13  For Ambedkar’s general outlook on colonialism and its impact on Indian society, see: Ambedkar 
(1991, 1994); for his consideration of specific issues, see Ambedkar (1923, 1925). 
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to play under the colonial dispensation. The slide of this discourse seems to be on 
consent over coercion; civil society over state; legitimacy over rule. Dalit-bahujans 
think that such prevarications are a typical ailment of the brahminical mind. They 
attempt to demonstrate that Brahmins are acutely aware of power but since it can-
not be reconciled to their status in society they would wish to see power exercised 
at their behest and in favour of their interests. But given the difficulties in ensuring 
such control under conditions of mass democracy Brahmins come to directly bid 
for political power in the name of people while at the same time disparaging power. 
Controlling or wielding political power, directly or indirectly, has been one of the 
main ways by which they have protected social institutions which bestow status and 
privileges on them.  
Dalit-bahujans are emphatic that they need to seek power and employ this 
power to bring about a radical transformation in society. They argue that the basic 
claims of the oppressed cannot wait the consent and approval of the dominant. 
Such consent may never come forth and even if it does, may not be on the terms of 
the oppressed. Ambedkar argued that under the conditions of humiliation in which 
dalit-bahujans live, to translate their rights into the obligations of others, power may 
have to be invoked. In Madras Province, Justice Party made its bid for power for 
the first time under the system of diarchy introduced by the Montague-Chelmsford 
reforms and employed that power to put in place a scheme of preferential treatment 
in public employment for non-Brahmins. Kanshiram, the ideologue and leader of 
the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), has called power, ›guru-Killi‹ or master-key which 
enables its wielders to open every lock whether, social, political, economic or cul-
tural (Dubey 2001).  
The search for power by bahujans has been perceived by brahminical persuasion 
apprehensively as leading to personalized and arbitrary exercise of power. While 
such a criticism has to be empirically validated, there is a significant difference be-
tween non-dalit bahujans and dalits in their disposition to political power. Dalits 
have suffered power rather than ever striven to wield it. Sensitive bahujan thinkers 
such as Jotirao Phule, Dr T. M. Nair and Periyar, therefore reiterated, over and over 
again, that the only way bahujans can strive to wield power is by taking along the 
untouchable communities such as the Mahars, the Mangs and the Pariahs. Ambed-
kar attempted to ideologically relocate dalits while at the same time stressing the 
need to learn to appreciate and participate in power directly. Dalits should not suf-
fer power but must learn to wield it and convert it into legitimacy in spite of all the 
obstacles in such an endeavour.  
One of the basic arguments of non-Brahmins has been that unless power was 
evenly distributed and shared amongst various communities there could not evolve 
a national community or a democratic polity in India. The principle of communal 
representation was therefore seen by them as an adjunct of democracy and empow-
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erment rather than merely as compensation. While Ambedkar had his reservations 
about communal representation and preferred representation based on universal 
adult franchise, expressing the principle ›one person one value‹, he argued that 
communities which are ethnically, linguistically and religiously distinct and those that 
are disadvantaged should find additional representation (see: Ambedkar 1982a, b). 
Community and Nation 
Mainstream nationalism in India overwhelmingly strove towards wielding a nation 
together in which particular identities, except probably religious, linguistic and adi-
vasi (original dwellers, tribal) will dissolve, sooner or later. Nation was to be the 
community writ large. Many dalit-bahujan thinkers, however, asserted a sense of 
belonging retaining distinct markers of identity, culture and language. They argued 
that dalit-bahujans belong to and participate in distinct cultural domains. Behind an 
unmarked nationalism they saw the ghost of brahminism looming large. It would be 
an identity which would have retained the brahminical structures and dispositions 
intact and further buttressed them with the resources of nationalism. For Periyar, 
one of the complete expression of political brahminism was Indian nationalism 
(Geetha/Rajadurai 1998: 320). 
Against such a conception of the nation, dalit-bahujan thought advanced a con-
ception of the nation as a community of communities. Every community needs to 
throw up its internal ways of upholding self-respect and composing the nation. The 
community so envisaged was described by Periyar as samadharmic where rights, 
claims and responsibilities would be equal and where there existed a measure of 
shared public and community experience (ibid.: 420–460). Such communities were 
seen as imbued with their distinct cultural markers. Iyothee Thass in Tamizham 
celebrated the civilizational and cultural achievements of pre-brahminical and Pariah 
Buddhist people. He argued that »original Dravidian culture« made of these ele-
ments was integral rather than divisive, interactive rather than exclusionary and 
inter-communicative rather than lofty and distant.  
Dalit-bahujan approach to caste remained quite ambivalent. On one hand it was 
acutely aware that caste was deeply implicated in the caste system, into the ranked 
order of deference, condescension and contempt. On the other, caste had a strong 
communitarian dimension. This communitarian dimension of caste often facilitated 
mobilization of communities into struggle and to bring about internal reforms. 
Therefore we find strident calls for the annihilation of caste on one hand, to ena-
bling all castes to progress on the other. Ambedkar in a famous essay called Annhi-
lation of Caste while calling for its rejection, remained deeply sceptical of such an 
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outcome and felt that the conditions that he suggested for the same were almost 
impossible to realize.  
While being vary of caste, dalit-bahujan discourse suggests that caste can be ap-
proached positively in the following three ways: 1.) Only a caste ranked way below 
in the caste hierarchy, qua caste, is entitled to positive valuation and only on the 
condition that it is prepared to extend solidarity and communitarian bonds to castes 
similarly placed. 2.) Such a caste must concede to its own members basic rights and 
opportunities. 3.) Such a caste must concede to the rights of all as persons, enforce 
self-respect towards itself from other castes and its members and treat members of 
the castes superior to it as individuals and not as members of castes. 
The significance that dalit-bahujans extend to community makes them partisan 
to local languages and popular cultures. Phule invokes peasant culture and practices 
centrally and pits them against the Arya-Brahmin culture. Tamil language and cul-
ture became major sites of investment for the self-respect movement. Congressmen 
in Madras, on the other hand, tried to promote Hindi as the future national lan-
guage of India (Geetha/Rajadurai 1998: 48–49). 
By and large dalit-bahujan thought is highly well-disposed towards the other re-
ligious communities and applies the imagery of community to them that they avow 
to themselves. However, Ambedkar prevaricates on this issue as he sees these 
communities as inextricably caught in the beliefs and practices prevalent in India 
and consequently being under the influence of brahminism (Ambedkar 1989). 
Irrespective of their other differences, dalit-bahujan thought conceived the na-
tion as a good society where its members, considered as individuals or collectivities, 
respect one another, protect mutual rights and show concern and solidarity. Self-
respecters therefore felt that as long as there is the existence of untouchability all 
talk of freedom and self-rule is empty. Periyar argued that the liberation of the 
Shudra was contingent on and would be complete only with the liberation of the 
Panchama. While he argues that a nation should not be based on religion, caste or 
race it is still marked by the existence of diverse communities. While the nation is 
envisaged by this discourse as a site of rights enclosing communities, no serious 
attention is paid to the possibility of conflicts between communities on one hand 
and communities and rights on the other, and the modes of resolving such con-
flicts.  
Ambedkar, however, embraced a complex notion of nationalism taking recourse 
to the ideas of Renan and greatly stressing the role of human agency rather than 
ascriptive belonging. One’s willing cooperation to be part of the corporate bond 
and the responsibility it places on the other members of such an associated life are 
central to Ambedkar’s conception of nationalism. He argued that race, language, 
common country etc. create certain predispositions and not necessarily the feeling 
of nationalism. He distinguished between nationality and nationalism. The former 
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refers to a consciousness of a kind that marks off a people from others while na-
tionalism is the desire for a separate national existence for those who share such a 
consciousness. The feeling of being a nationality need not translate itself into na-
tionalism (Ambedkar 2002d) and a nationality may coexist within a nation-state for 
an indefinite period depending upon the fairness of the kind of treatment meted out 
to it.  
Avowal of Political Values 
What should be the normative grounding for the ordering of the polity and for the 
functioning of its social and political institutions? Dalit-bahujan thought invokes 
continuously the values of justice, liberty, equality and fraternity for the purpose. 
The tensions and conflicts that often arise in reconciling between the demands of 
these values are frequently overlooked and whenever such tensions and conflicts are 
taken into account their resolution is sought by appeal to human nature as deserving 
respect. Justice of course is seen as distribution of the fruits of social cooperation, 
honours, resources and legacies based on the prior assumption that every person is 
entitled to equal consideration unless qualified by other acceptable norms. The 
Brahmanical order was seen as undermining such equal consideration and the re-
spect we owe to persons as persons. The fruits and bounties to be distributed are 
not merely economic but cultural resources and political opportunities as well.  
The criteria to be employed in a scheme of distribution of this kind is an issue 
reflected upon by this thought-stream but it does not centrally invoke Marxist 
analysis and resolutions to the fore in its consideration14. Dalit-bahujan thought is 
acutely aware that justice is denied in the economic market place but the relation-
ship between such deprivation and the subordination/domination wrought by the 
caste system that assigns social produce as per caste ranking, without any merit and 
even endeavour of the person, is not adequately considered.  
Dalit-bahujan thought notes that caste society places all possible hurdles on the 
exercise of freedom. Such a denial of freedom particularly affects the untouchables. 
But the central value that this thought privileges is equality. Equality is not merely 
equality before law or equality of treatment. Such expressions of equality, while 
desired, could reinforce inequality, if other considerations of equality do not fore-
—————— 
 14  Ambedkar, Periyar and others had extensively reflected on Marxist considerations on the issue but 
not to the extent that Marxism lent itself to: For Ambedkar’s consideration of the issue, see: Am-
bedkar (1987); for Periyar, see: Geetha/Rajadurai (1998: 368ff.). For one of the important Marxist 
considerations on the issue, see: Lukes (1987). 
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ground such endeavours. Dalits-bahujans, therefore, by and large, demand that 
equality of respect and equal consideration be extended to all. It makes them to tilt 
towards a positive notion of liberty, defence of preferential treatment and avowal of 
a strong state.  
Self-respect movement counterposed samadharma to manudharma. The former 
»assumed equality amongst men and between men and women as a given relation 
but, more important, it required that that this equality be realized in and through an 
affirmation of each individual’s self-respect« (Geetha/Rajadurai 1998: 420). They 
declared Buddhism as the oldest samadharmic creed. The working class movement 
was seen as engaged in samadharmic struggle (ibid.: 422). Self-respecters launched a 
critique of the Catholic Church for sustaining hierarchy and caste differences which 
were not in tune with samadharma. 
Avowal of equality is central to Ambedkar’s line of thought. He saw it as the 
only reasonable governing principle, allowing a degree of inequality only on entitle-
ments based on one’s own effort and not on heredity and social inheritance based 
on parental care, education and accumulation of scientific knowledge. He argued 
that selection of individuals »in whose favour there is birth, education, family name, 
business connections and inherited wealth« would not be the selection of the able 
but of the ›privileged‹. He argued that one can get most out of men only by treating 
them as equals. Equality has a better appeal to reason while inequality seems arbi-
trary (Ambedkar 2002b: 276f.). 
Caste society precludes people from experiencing the joy of rights and the satis-
faction of sharing based on rights. Dalit-bahujan thought not merely argued that 
rights should be made universally applicable and available but be broadened and 
made more substantial. Temple entry; access to public spaces; untouchability aboli-
tion struggles, campaign to secure gender equality, political participation etc were 
seen as some of the ways of pursuing the same. 
Avowal of Civic Republicanism 
Inherited authority and the rule of the meritorious and wise is deeply suspect in the 
perspective of dalit-bahujans although to the extent they are embodied in the shap-
ing of communities of the kind discussed above, they are acceptable. The former 
are therefore acceptable to the extent and in so far as they have found acceptability 
in the community. A self-governing political community in which citizens partici-
pate as equals to realize the good of both the individual as well as the collective is 
one of the assertion central to this thought. If rule of law and equality before law 
are central to the organization of public life, then dalit-bahujan thought thinks that 
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participation of the concerned is a desideratum for the framing of rule of law. Rule 
of law is not the dictate of the wise, associated in India with brahminism, nor of 
customary authority, but a dictate of reason approved by people, after due delibera-
tion, through bodies sanctioned by them for the purpose. 
The idea of civic-republicanism is invoked prominently in the writings of Phule 
and he counterposes it to monarchical authority and brahmanical tradition that 
came to be instituted in India. Phule thinks that republican tradition had flourished 
in India once upon a time and laterly had come to blossom in Britain by »mixing 
republicanism with hereditary lords and kings« which he calls a »wondrous three-
some pancake« (Deshpande 2002: 151). He thought that the marginalization of the 
Shudras, Ati-shudras, peasantry and women is largely due to the decline of the civic 
republican spirit. The resurgence of the West was due to the blooming of the re-
publican spirit. For Phule, the great virtues of public spirit and heroism are integral 
to the spirit of civic republicanism.  
 Dalit-bahujan thought almost universally thinks that revelation and sacred texts 
do not provide us with principles to organize our public life. The latter have to be 
based on reasoned reflection and ways of people who wish to set up their life in 
common. Even the Buddha, for Ambedkar, speaks on grounds of reason rather 
than authority (Ambedkar 1957).  
A strand of thought that runs through the dalit-bahujan thought is the invoca-
tion of rule of law and not rule of persons. In a way it seems to be an emphasis out 
of tune with certain other concerns of this current of thought. Law and customs, 
often justified in the name of dharma, had upheld the lowly position of dalit–bahu-
jans for ages. However, targeting Manusmriti and contesting traditional body of 
laws and customs did not result in contempt towards rule of law. If anything it was 
just the contrary. Dalit-bahujans tended to rally in favour of rule of law, which 
partly explains the success of constitutional democracy in India and marginalization 
of tendencies of fundamentalisms of various kind and absence of resort to armed 
struggle on a vast scale. He felt that in India there is a dire need to instil this repub-
lican value of constitutional morality among its citizens, because, »Democracy in 
India is only a top-dressing on an Indian soil, which is essentially undemocratic« 
(ibid.: 485). 
The demand for representation outweighs the demand for self-rule within dalit-
bahujan thought. Conversely there is no meaning to self-rule without representation 
and participation. Ambedkar was to make the demand for universal adult franchise, 
irrespective of the considerations of caste, community, gender, level of education 
and income before the Simon Commission, the first one to do so, as integral to 
considerations of constitutional reforms in India (see: Ambedkar 1982). The non-
brahmin and self-respect movements make considerations of representation and 
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constitution of public authority on the basis of the participation and approval of the 
public central to their agenda. 
The concept of the citizen, his rights and duties and the need to expand citizen-
ship across the cleavages of caste, class, gender and religion is interwoven with this 
civic-republican thinking. The clarity in this regard and the distinctiveness of em-
phasis marks off this thought from all other currents of thought present in the 
nationalist discourse. Citizenship is marked not merely by rights and the obligation 
to respect similar rights of others but also in accepting one’s share of public duties 
and responsibilities. It is the citizen-body that formulates the good of the polity 
through its representatives and through their numerous formal and informal inter-
ventions. Phule thinks that republicanism begets civic virtues such as the sense of 
public duty, public-spiritedness and commitment to safeguard the health of public 
institutions15. There is a strong emphasis on freedom as non-domination in dalit-
bahujan thought, and freedom conceived as absence of mastery by others. The laws 
of a good state – a republic – enhance the freedoms enjoyed by citizens. The state 
in this view is not against civic freedom, rather it could be ›freedom-friendly‹. This 
appreciation of public authority duly constituted with peoples’ consent and partici-
pation, while being rare in India, was the characteristic mark of dalit-bahujan 
thought. 
Communal Representation and Preferential Policies 
For Dalit-bahujans preferential consideration to marginalized social groups, the 
oppressed social strata, the exploited classes and ill-represented communities and 
cultures is normatively grounded in their understanding of the human person, moral 
considerations of justice, issues of rights and representation, understanding and role 
of state and the significance of communities and cultures. In fact dalit-bahujan 
discourse is characterized by its refusal to engage with proposals of preferential 
treatment as an issue of policy delinked from larger normative considerations. In all 
his major considerations on preferential treatment from Evidence before the Southbor-
ough Committee to States and Minorities (Ambedkar 1982a), Ambedkar locates his posi-
tive proposals in such considerations. A commitment to preferential consideration 
is a commitment to a set of norms and not merely to certain practices. 
Dalit-bahujans think that humiliation and the deprivation of self-respect are the 
characteristic marks of the social institutions they confront which leave behind 
—————— 
 15  The killing of Julius Caesar by Brutus for violating the republican spirit is extensively discussed by 
Phule, see: Despande (2002: 151). 
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long-term impact on the constitution of their selves. They do not think that civil-
society institutions on their own are likely to play a major role in restoring this self-
respect and facilitate the growth of a confident personality unless such institutions 
reflectively carry such a commitment. One of the institutions they regard as crucial 
in this respect is religion. Religion can play a major role in according recognition, a 
sense of belonging and a sense of solidarity. They regard the role of state ideology 
too as crucial for the purpose in proposing a set of values and policies and in un-
dermining the hold of those institutions which reproduce humiliation and disad-
vantage. But all such endeavours can be meaningful for the inculcation of a sense of 
dignity and purpose if they are products of self-initiative, rather than merely acts of 
reparation and penance undertaken by others. 
Dalit-bahujan thought regards education as a major initiative in this regard. 
Against the drift towards higher education and general education this conception on 
education laid great stress on primary education and to an extent on technical edu-
cation. It also argued for a different kind of education, that which relates itself to 
the productive and social practices of dalit-bahujans. A constant refrain in their writ-
ings is that they are, »the toilers, the producing communities, and it was their work 
which made possible the riches of Indian civilization«. If education can bring these 
concerns centrally to the fore, the kind of toil they undertake will find recognition 
too. They stressed their stake »in the land, as being strong, capable men who did not 
disdain manual labour« (Geetha/Rajadurai 1998: 135). Dalit-bahujans therefore 
demanded resources for education, to enhance their skills and their labouring ca-
pacity wherein not merely their productive ability improves but they are able to 
enjoy and sustain their productive engagement overtime.  
Dalit-bahujan thought argues that a nation-state based on equal rights can rein-
force the dominance of social groups situated favourably in the existing social rela-
tions by eliciting the consent of the governed to their dominance. Equal rights may 
lead to the constitution of public authority deeply marked by one or the other 
dominant social groups. Therefore alongside the existence of equal rights this 
thought suggested representation of communities that can reasonably and in fair 
measure be accommodated in the constitution of public authority. The same argu-
ment was applied for public employment as well. Phule in fact opined that it might 
be better to reserve opportunities to Brahmins in public employment in proportion 
to their population since they had gobbled up a large share of public employment 
by using the advantages and leverage they enjoyed (Deshpande 2002: 87). 
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Religion and Morality 
To the extent they acknowledge religion, dalit-bahjan thinkers do not regard it as 
private. The distinction between a public space bereft of religion, and which ex-
cludes religion, is not central to dalit-bahujan thought as has been generally the case 
with mainstream liberal and Marxist strands. Ambedkar felt, 
»It is an error to look upon religion as a matter which is individual, private and personal (…) 
religion becomes a source of positive mischief if not danger when it remains individual, private and 
personal. Equally mistaken is the view that religion is the flowering of special religious instinct 
inherent in the nature of the individual. The correct view is that religion like language is social for 
the reason that either is essential for social life and the individual has to have it because without it 
he cannot participate in the life of the society.« (Ambedkar 2002e: 225) 
Dalit-bahujan thinkers primarily ask the question: What does religion do to us? 
They see religion as fashioning the bond between people and wielding them into a 
community. Therefore it is not religion as such that needs to be kept away from the 
public domain. The issue of concern is the kind of religion that can be reconciled 
with the demands of community. Some belief-systems and practices cannot be 
accepted as worthy of religion as they do not meet such a requirement. 
Phule conceives his God as a loving father who regards men and women 
equally. But it is men and women in their association who design appropriate moral 
and political worlds for themselves and it is the telos they should strive after. He 
pays no attention to life beyond this world. Ambedkar invested a great deal in his 
religious quest and was concerned that it should be in tune with the rights-perspec-
tive. He argued that religion of the right kind is essential for society. It is the basis 
for sustaining a vibrant moral life. It is the cement that binds people together. The 
perspective shaped by religion keeps rights in check while at the same time up-
holding and nourishing them. He argued that Buddha’s teachings eminently embody 
such a perspective. He attempted to make a distinction between dharma as a dis-
tinct set of beliefs and practices and dhamma which is the basis of solidarity and 
community among people. He felt that social and political life based on rights may 
not ensure stability overtime and rights might be into irresolvable conflict. Religion 
as a moral terrain can play a major role in effectively responding to such conflicts 
and sustaining larger solidarities. Invariably all of them trace a special relation of the 
oppressed and marginalized to Buddhism, as early as from the time of Phule. Thass 
argued that Pariahs were in fact the original Tamils whose religion was Buddhism. 
Pariahs were degraded and their religion systematically destroyed when Aryan in-
vaders from the North imposed their rule and culture on the original Tamils. 
Periyar, however, avows atheism. He develops a critique of religion as a world-
view that determines a believer’s understanding of what is sacred and profound. 
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Such a worldview ultimately limits the human, qualifies his/her potentialities and 
retards his/her growth. Priestcraft is inevitably bound up with religion and so are 
rituals and practices. Periyar and his followers were not merely opposed to the so 
called Brahmin and Aryan texts and gods. They extended their criticism to Saiva 
Siddanta texts as well such as Kandapuranam, Thirutondar Puranam and Periyapuranam 
(ibid.: 340). Like Ambedkar they did not think much of the Bhakti movement. They 
felt that Bhakti and devotion did not »reform priestly behaviour or the rules of caste 
society« (ibid.: 342). They also developed a comprehensive critique of the political 
economy of religion. They pointed out the waste involved and the alliance between 
commerce and religion that it consolidated.  
The difference between Periyar and Ambedkar on this issue cannot be easily re-
solved but the relation they invoke are central to their differences: Ambedkar raises 
the question of religion in the context of justice and rights while Periyar does so in 
relation to human reason. For Ambedkar, religion in a secular society is a prerequi-
site for any enduring and collective pursuit of good life. It elevates baser orienta-
tions and provides a better perspective to resolve conflicts and interests. It upholds 
altruism, making people to reach out to others; it binds people in solidarity and 
concern; it nurtures and cares; it is oriented towards service; militates against ex-
ploitation, injustice and wrongdoing and teaches respect towards others. Ambedkar 
while thus defending the need for a religion, refuses to entertain belief in a personal 
God, revelation and salvation. 
Conclusion 
It is not suggested here that that the themes discussed above, central to dalit-bahu-
jan thought, are exclusive to this current of thought. However, the slope of these 
ideas and the relations across them were to be worked out differently by dalit-ba-
hujan thought as compared to other currents of social and political thought in India 
or even elsewhere. It charted the principles of public life differently from others. 
These are not the only ideas that they considered as significant. There were several 
other associated ideas such as critique of the culture of masculinity, considerations 
on rights, citizenship, rule of law and constitutionalism, culture, exploitation, non-
violence and protest that they reflected on and reformulated them afresh. What is to 
be appreciated is the remarkable agreement on what constituted the core issues 
regarding self, society and polity across this body of thought as a whole and the 
implications they have for an enriched conception of democracy. At the same time 
there are significant differences across this thought-current on the substantive con-
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tent of these ideas and their relationships, which partly explain the political conflicts 
bedevilling this constituency. 
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